Negotiation (4): per ambigua ad astra

Time, Place

‘Through ambiguity to the stars’—a tag suggested by some unknown wit around Dag Hammarskjöld as the motto for his diplomatic method. Hammarskjöld didn’t seem to mind: when Egyptian newspapers referred to him as ‘Mr. Flexible’ during delicate negotiations in 1956-57, he promptly adopted the name in private correspondence with his communications director, George Ivan Smith, whom he addressed as ‘Mr. Fluid.’ Hammarskjöld necessarily played across the long continuum between stark clarity of statement and decision, and useful ambiguity that left situations open. The passages below—many reporting Hammarskjöld observed by others, some from his own statements—reflect this zone in his approach to negotiation.

The first word belongs to James Reston (1909-95), the famously insightful New York Times columnist who followed Hammarskjöld’s efforts throughout his years as secretary-general. Reston writes here on August 10, 1960, when the Congo crisis was in full swing, under the title ‘United Nations: A Refuge of Sanity in a Silly World’:

This remarkable man is proving to be one of the great natural resources in the world today, and it is difficult to think of another in the field of world diplomacy who could do the job as well. He is tireless. He is infinitely patient. He is sensitive to the slightest troublesome breeze in the world. He knows exactly what his job will let him do and forbid him from doing. And he knows when to be ambiguous; he also knows when to be precise…. That he has exercised [his] powers with such skill as to win the respect, if not the affection, of the contending states is one reason why the UN is now a refuge for common sense in a satanic world.

Emery Kelen, early biographer and UN staff member, provides his report:
Many of the ambiguous resolutions passed by the Security Council were written by Dag Hammarskjöld in his own convoluted and Delphic style. In the case of a delicate issue, it is this sort of document alone that has a chance to pass or at least have the benefit of abstentions, for anything short of ambiloquence is promptly beheaded by the veto…. Once he had gotten such a resolution passed, its vague language left him a wide margin for interpretation, and he was able to perform diplomatic magic. Someone has suggested Hammarskjöld’s motto ought to have been Per ambigua ad astra.
(Kelen, 83)

As always, Sir Brian Urquhart—close colleague of Hammarskjöld’s and his foremost biographer—offers insight:
He was extremely articulate and also capable of the most amazing obscurity when necessary—which lent a slight air of mystery to what he was doing, especially later on, in political matters—which, actually, is a very good trick because then you can spring new ideas on people at exactly the right moment when they might be wishing to grasp for them. That was his great strength in negotiation.
(Urquhart, oral history project 1984, 20)

However, the point about ambiguity shouldn’t be overstated: Hammarskjold dealt in facts, and acted with clarity and decision, whenever circumstances permitted. Ambiguity was a tactic; peace with justice was the goal. The following two brief statements reflect his commitment to clarity:

The men who fought in Korea have given us the possibility of a new beginning…. Should we, by any failure in wisdom, in firmness of faith, or in clarity of purpose, fumble this opportunity, then the verdict of history upon us would justly be contemptuous.
(PP II, 1953, 198)

The term ‘self-defense,’ in my view, has to be qualified in two ways in order to avoid ambiguity. One is with reference to the Charter. That follows from the fact that the Secretary-General cannot possibly be supposed to have discussions with Member Nations on any other basis than that of the Charter.
(PP III, press conference, 123)

Now that we’ve noted Hammarskjöld’s mix of methods—ambiguity where necessary, clarity when possible—we can look further at his use of ambiguity in the negotiation process. The following four passages refer to the immensely difficult negotiations that resolved the Suez crisis of late 1956 and 1957.

Much as I will try to slip around all corners and avoid saying whether the cat is white or black, because it is so dark all around, I am very much afraid that someone may have a torch and discover the sad secret the very moment the cat tries to catch a rat—that is to say, to do something.
(Hammarskjöld quoted in Urquhart, 212)

[The arrangements] are becoming almost metaphysical in their subtlety. I have no complaint about that because if, from the beginning of this operation, we had attempted to be specific, we would not have had an operation at all.
(Hammarskjöld quoted in Urquhart, 192; attributed elsewhere to the Canadian diplomat, Lester Pearson, describing Hammarskjöld’s approach)

In the vacuum which suddenly developed in the Suez crisis, I had, for what it was worth, to throw in everything I had to try to tide over; it was one of those irrational and extremely dangerous situations in which only something as irrational on a different level could break the spell.
(DH letter to the journalist Max Ascoli, Nov. 29, 1956)

‘In order to gain the necessary time,’ he told the committee, ‘I accepted a certain lack of clarity.’
(Urquhart, biography of Ralph Bunche, 269-70)

Finally, a longer passage by Dorothy V. Jones, who evokes Mr. Flexible at the top of his form:
The methods that Hammarskjöld used to nudge things long…sprang from his view of his place in the organization. He saw himself always as a servant of the UN. This view is rather more subtle than it might at first appear. It was a reading of his position that allowed him a certain degree of flexibility since the term ‘United Nations’ could be interpreted to mean either the Member States, or the Organization as a semi-independent entity. By adopting this position, Hammarskjöld could refuse or agree to take certain actions on the grounds that he was carrying out the will of the Member States, acting through the Security Council or the General Assembly. When in 1958 he was pressured…to expand the UN presence in Lebanon from an observer group to a military force, he did not have to say that he thought this would be most unwise – although he did think so. He could simply say that such a move would go beyond what the Security Council had authorized. There the Member States, speaking through the Council, were his cover for refusal to take an action that he did not want to take. On the other hand, when opposed by powerful Member States,…he could fall back on the Charter as the authority for actions that he felt impelled to take on behalf of the purposes of the Organization as set out in that document. Ambiguity in definition was taken by Hammarskjöld as an opportunity for creative action – a tactic that could be as useful today as it was in the mid-20th century.
(The Adventure of Peace, 196)

◊ ◊ ◊

Negotiation (3): at the United Nations

Time, Place

In the course of restating Dag Hammarskjöld’s political wisdom for readers today, this site has so far taken little notice of the United Nations issues with which Hammarskjöld was actually grappling. This week’s edition is all UN throughout. The ideas reflected here may initially seem dated or of narrow interest only. But a closer look shows that here too is political wisdom for our time. Consider Hammarskjöld’s painstaking concern to find the right venue and timing for negotiations, for the participation of all relevant parties including the most belligerent and inconvenient, for a stubbornly rational analysis of issues, for leaving as few loose ends as possible, for couching negotiated solutions in a context of law. Attitudes and perspectives that remain broadly applicable.

Dag Hammarskjöld was famous in his era for his agile practice of what he called quiet diplomacy: behind-the-scenes meetings with adversaries, often serving as an adviser respected by all and providing a communication channel.

There has always been this practice of private—or quiet—diplomacy in the United Nations, and there has been a marked increase in its use…. But the need for it is not sufficiently understood. The best results of negotiation between two parties cannot be achieved in international life, any more than in our private worlds, in the full glare of publicity with current public debate of all moves, unavoidable misunderstandings, inescapable freezing of position due to considerations of prestige, and the temptation to utilize public opinion as an element integrated in the negotiation itself.
(PP IV, 27)

In the General Assembly, as well as in the Councils, open debate is the rule. The public and the press are admitted to practically all meetings and are able to follow the development of arguments, the evolution of conflicts and the arrival at solutions. The debates cover a ground which in earlier times was mostly reserved for negotiation behind closed doors. They have introduced a new instrument of negotiation, that of conference diplomacy. This instrument has many advantages. It can serve to form public opinion. It can subject national policies and proposals to the sharp tests of world-wide appraisal, thus revealing the strength, or weakness, of a cause that might otherwise have remained hidden. It can activate the sound instincts of the common man in favor of righteous causes. It can educate and guide. But it has, also, weaknesses. There is the temptation to play to the gallery at the expense of solid construction. And there is the risk that positions once taken publicly become frozen, making compromise more difficult.
(PP II, 521)

I feel that in order to make the operations of the Security Council fully fruitful, it is desirable that all efforts should be made beforehand to reduce the differences of opinion to an absolute minimum, so as to present to the world from that very high forum only what remains to be settled in open negotiation after attempts to iron out differences, as far as possible, in privacy.
(PP II, 667)

Unlike the Assembly and the Councils, the Office of the Secretary-General, by its very nature under the Charter, must practice private diplomacy on almost all occasions until results are reached. In recent years the Secretary-General has increasingly been used for operations of a purely diplomatic type, either on behalf of the United Nations as such, or for one government in relation to another on a good offices basis. He is in a position of trust vis-à-vis all the member governments. He speaks for no government. It should go without saying that in the course of a negotiation, or a mission of good offices, he must respect fully the laws of diplomatic discretion. He can never give away what must be considered the property of the government with whom he is working. Nor could he pass public judgment upon their policies without wrecking the use of his office for the diplomatic purposes for which experience shows that it is much needed. Of course, when a mission has resulted in a formal agreement between the parties, the agreement is made public, but it is, of course, not for him to evaluate it in public.
(PP IV, 29)

It is quite obvious that, if you exclude certain countries from a specific form of negotiation which may be needed to solve problems concerning those countries, you are really cutting off your hands.
(PP II, 535)


Dag Hammarskjöld inherited from his father, Hjalmar, a lifelong commitment to the development of international law. ‘Over the years,’ he said in 1959 (PP IV, 355), ‘…again and again in my reports to the General Assembly I have pleaded for a greater role for the International Court and, in general terms, for greater interest in and respect of the legal aspects which practically every political question has.’ The following passage relates that concern to the negotiation process:

There are disputes…in which the existing law really covers all or some of the issues, but those concerned simply do not wish to settle on the basis of law, though they admit its binding force. This attitude is not necessarily misguided. It may be desired to settle by conciliation, and it may be thought that a clear definition of the rights of the parties would leave too little flexibility for negotiation to bring them together. But a clarification of the legal position can often help when the positions of the parties are too far apart to be reconciled. Moreover, a negotiated solution that ignores the legal issues is just as unlikely to be permanent as a solution that ignores any other main aspect of the case; a party which is induced to accept a settlement without any consideration of its legal claims is likely to retain an abiding sense of injustice.
(PP II, 594)


And finally, this quietly heated encounter in a December 1954 press conference convened just before Hammarskjöld left on the ‘Mission to Beijing’ to negotiate, if possible, the release of American airmen convicted by the Chinese government of spying. Here Hammarskjöld defends a range of values bearing on negotiation: clarity of intent, precise use of words, cool not hot and emotive interpretation.

QUESTION: By undertaking this trip to Peking under the instructions of the Assembly do you not feel that the head of the World Organization is now going to Peking to kneel somehow before Mr. Chou En-lai for the release of the thirteen Americans?
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: I do not get your point.
QUESTION: I mean do you not feel that there is a kind of humiliation for the United Nations, which is a belligerent organization with the Chinese, to go to China to beg them or ask them to release the thirteen Americans?
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: I am not going anywhere to beg anybody for anything. I am going to bring up a situation which in my view calls for mutual consideration with the background to which I can refer in the General Assembly resolution.
QUESTION: I gather though that Mr. Chou En-lai replied that he wished to discuss pertinent questions.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: So do I.
QUESTION: Could you tell us whether you are willing to discuss other matters than the question of the prisoners which was specified by the resolution?
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Well, it all depends upon what you mean by the word ‘discuss.’ I feel that you put into that word exchanges of views coming very close to negotiation. And if that is what you put into the word ‘discuss,’ I can only point out to you that the Secretary-General in this context acts under a specific authorization which is limited to one set of problems.
(PP II, 433)

◊ ◊ ◊

Negotiation (2): working attitudes

Time, Place

Last week we looked at some elements of Dag Hammarskjöld’s personality and approach to negotiations. In press conferences and many other venues, he often discussed negotiation in very practical terms. On some occasions, of course, he rose to what we now call ‘30,000 feet’ to take in the larger landscape of political processes, in which negotiation is a central element. Both the practical and the lofty are reflected in this week’s collection of working attitudes.

Joseph P. Lash, Hammarskjöld’s earliest biographer and a journalist on the UN ‘beat’ since 1950, reported a passage on negotiation that doesn’t seem to be recorded elsewhere:

[Dag Hammarskjöld] had been brought up to think of negotiation…, ‘not as something immoral but as a responsible and sensible activity—as a process of working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement with someone I had to live with. To negotiate with someone never meant to me I had to like him or approve of him, much less that I was willing to sell out my principles.’
(Lash, 148)


Hammarskjöld’s first major diplomatic effort as secretary-general was a negotiation with the premier of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, in 1954-55. Under the authority of the UN General Assembly, he was asked to seek the release of 13 Americans who had been convicted of spying by a military tribunal. The larger context was the Korean War and the absence of direct US-China diplomatic relations. The following three remarks all stem from his challenging mission to Beijing, whose success prompted many governments to trust his judgment and ability.

In a negotiation, is not the very first step to make your own attitude, and the basis for your own attitude, perfectly clear?
(PP II, 443)

The contact…does reflect an attitude of…playing fair on the basis of objective study of facts. It is obvious that it’s a rather tender plant when you open talks of this type, and under a blast of strong emotional reactions which, so to say, wreck the basis laid in one respect or another—that is to say, to introduce an element of propaganda on either side—the other one would of course find it rather difficult to continue.
(PP II, 448)

When one prepares a soup, it is sometimes part of that preparation to take the soup off the fire. That may also be the case in this special kind of field. There are times when one furthers the purpose of negotiation by not sitting at the table all the time. I do not know whether, just at this moment, any discussion is going on…. But, if there is an interval of silence, even such an interval may result in a wider perspective, greater calm, and lesser heat, and in that way may serve the purposes of negotiation.
(PP II, 479)


Under the topic of common ground we have seen this passage before, but it belongs here also:

It may be quite possible that there are points in this whole setup where an Israel interest and an Arab interest, because of some development, happen to coincide because it happens to fit in with the plans on both sides. If that is so,…it obviously would be nonsensical not to try to get it down and, at least, to get somewhere.
(PP II, 290)


Hammarskjöld had no illusions about creating through political processes ‘the best of all possible worlds.’ His realism about the outcome of many negotiations is reflected in the following:

We have to maneuver…in such as way as to give free swing to those forces which are constructive and conciliatory. And if we can do that, we shall do well enough. Nature has a certain healing quality and ability which is likely to bring us to a state of affairs where people may still be grudging and unhappy but where they see what is irreversible.
(PP III, 56)


Toward the beginning of this online exploration of Hammarskjöld’s thought (‘A political primer,’ Feb. 23, 2009), we heard him warn against rigidity of mind, which he equated with unwillingness or inability to remain a lifelong learner. In the two comments just below, made to a university audience, he relates this issue to the needs of negotiation.

Self-righteousness and intellectual self-sufficiency produce a rigidity which is the best ally of our adversaries because it blinds us both to our own weakness and to their strength. But it is also a source of conflicts.
(PP II, 303)

Those who are inspired by idealism to work for freedom should first of all—as an expression of their faith and in the interest of their ideals—have the strength to admit their own limitations and the possible justice of the cause of others. Ultimately this flexibility is but a reflection of our insight into the essential unity of all mankind.
(PP II, 303)


In an extended passage from a talk with students in New York City, Hammarskjöld touches on many points, notably the issue of good faith in negotiations:

The other day I read some observations on the perennial laws of peace-making made by an outstanding observer of foreign affairs. He enumerated what he called the fundamentals of good negotiation—careful preparation, truthfulness, precision, patience, impassivity, and modesty. These are good qualities on all roads of life. They are essential in dealings between nations or inside nations where we have to carry responsibility for the fate of others. There is a widespread view that diplomacy is a game where it pays to be shrewd, where moral laws are somehow suspended, and where it is laudable to fool your adversary. Need I tell you that such a view is wrong? Diplomacy of this kind may yield temporary and limited successes, but it will never lay the foundation for lasting agreements or understanding. Frankly, how can anyone believe that the road to a world of justice and peace is one of deceit and the destructive use of force? In international politics the right road is to defend to the best of your ability the interests which you are called upon to represent, but always in ways that uphold the principles which you want to see realized in the world of tomorrow. The laws applicable to constructive politics are not different from the laws applying to a game based on fair play: fight for your team but remember that your adversaries of today were your friends of yesterday and will have to be your friends of tomorrow.
(PP II, 464-65)


Hammarskjöld took many opportunities to restate the fundamental values of the United Nations—here in terms of the challenges of negotiation:

We bow before an ideal of life, and an example of profound faith, faith in the dignity but also in the good sense and fundamental decency of men. Without this ideal and this faith, who would seek to follow the course of patient negotiation, of ceaseless effort to conciliate, to mediate, to compose differences, to appeal to men’s reason in order to build agreement? This ideal of public service and this faith in the ultimate triumph of good will are a living reality. They are the foundation upon which the United Nations itself is built.
(PP II, 78, at a July 1953 ceremony recalling the Swedish martyr, Count Folke Bernadotte)

◊ ◊ ◊

Negotiation (1): Hammarskjöld at work

Time, Place

At this site we have not much relied on biography. But if we set out to explore a little further Dag Hammarskjöld’s concept and practice of negotiation, there is no better start than to read his closest UN colleagues’ efforts to describe his character and conduct on the job. Sound principles and strategies are effective only when lived. From this perspective, Hammarskjöld’s individuality—how he struck his colleagues, what they admired in him, where they faulted him—will shed light. Our four informants are distinguished: Sir Brian Urquhart, a military man of strategic insight and organizational expertise, later Hammarskjöld’s foremost biographer, and to this day a highly valued commentator on international affairs and the UN; Ralph Bunche, 1950 Nobel laureate for his peace work in the Middle East, African-American, brilliant; Andrew W. Cordier, a veteran UN leader with whom Hammarskjöld shared every task, later dean of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs; Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian diplomat entrusted by both Nehru and Hammarskjöld with the most difficult challenges. This week, their testimony; next week, return to Hammarskjöld’s ideas about the key element of political processes: negotiation. The Latin roots of the word are nec + otium: not-leisure. What were our ancestors thinking of?

With Ben-Gurion, and in Israel, Hammarskjöld found a far more receptive audience than he had expected. After their first meeting, Ben-Gurion, who admired toughness and ability and had already found that Hammarskjöld’s detailed knowledge of Middle Eastern problems was as formidable as his skill in negotiation, jokingly asked, ‘And where did they find you?’
(Urquhart, 144)

One need not elaborate here on the widely accepted fact that he was one of the truly great men of our times; on his widely known and deserved reputation for being uniquely gifted in intelligence, wisdom, statesmanship, and courage or on his literally total dedication to the causes of peace and human advancement and the United Nations efforts to promote them. We who worked with him came to know Dag Hammarskjöld also as bold, sometimes daring in his moves and approaches to problems, but not reckless. He was not given to acting without cool and thorough calculation, and was never one to act impulsively, although when an idea firmly commended itself to him he would pursue it doggedly. It is not suggested, however, that he was above anger, even fury, or other emotions. He could and at times did erupt. He had an uncanny and almost intuitive sense of political timing, and this may have been one of his greatest assets throughout his years of devoted service to the United Nations.
(Bunche, 189-90)

He had a lightning capacity for the gathering and appraisal of facts, for the making and implementation of decisions. I never had the impression that he worried himself into decisions. One could see his brilliant mind at work picking out relevant facts, outlining alternative avenues of action, arriving quickly at a formulation of the policy or decision necessary to the problem. Nor did he worry about a decision after it was made. He frequently indulged in a reasoned self-confidence that the decision taken was the right one.... He combined sound, hard realism with an extraordinary imagination. When others saw no further possibility of progress, he devised a means and a pattern of further negotiation, for eventual breakthroughs in touchy and baffling problems. His convincing and brilliant analysis of issues and his unique and effective techniques in carrying them to further stages of solution were combined with an energy which astounded collaborators and observers alike.... His unflinching courage rested upon his faith upon principles and ideals derived from a sturdy and valued heritage and an intellect alive with almost limitless appraisal of values with meaning for himself and humanity.
(Andrew W. Cordier, cited in Van Dusen, 112-13)

He was extremely firm. He was always slightly ahead of the game. He had a brilliant analytical mind and was able to think ahead of problems—something that almost nobody I know can do. He was extremely articulate and also capable of the most amazing obscurity when necessary—which lent a slight air of mystery to what he was doing, especially later on, on political matters—which, actually, is a very good trick because then you can spring new ideas on people at exactly the right moment when they might be wishing to grasp for them. That was his great strength in negotiation. He was a very imaginative, extremely knowledgeable man. Hammarskjöld had an infinite capacity for absorbing basic facts on any subject. We were all much surprised later on, for example, when the Suez Canal got blocked in 1956 to find that Hammarskjöld was an expert on international marine insurance and toll rates….
(Urquhart, oral history project 1984, 20)

Then, of course,…the affair of the American airmen in China, where the United States had got itself into a corner—because, on the one hand, they refused to have anything to do with the Communist Chinese government in Beijing and, on the other, were demanding the release of American airmen who had come down in China and had been condemned as spies. It was a rather tricky situation; there were 17 of them. Like many impossible situations, it wound up first of all in the Security Council, then in the General Assembly and, in the end, it was dumped in the lap of the Secretary-General—and everybody assumed that that was the end of it. Hammarskjöld…proceeded to take it on as a job—which nobody thought was possible. To do that he went to Beijing and conducted a most elaborate negotiation…and finally got those people out. It was then that [US Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles suddenly realized…that Hammarskjöld got results. I must say—greatly to everybody’s credit—they then realized they were dealing with a major international figure of a very unusual kind.… And the British, who had been somewhat critical about him, also realized he was something to reckon with.
(Urquhart, oral history project 1984, 23-24)

This is where I think he became unstuck. He did very well in sophisticated parts of the world—the Middle East or even Southeast Asia, where you have a very long sophisticated culture—where those very complicated, nuanced plans he used to work out, which were really amazing, did fine. For example, in Lebanon in 1958 he really did a remarkable job of solving what was in fact an extremely hairy problem. After all, there was a civil war in which the United States had suddenly landed with 14,000 marines—he has never got any credit for it, because nobody wanted to admit it was a mistake—but the fact of the matter is it was Hammarskjöld who provided the basis upon which Eisenhower was able to withdraw the marines with honor…and he did it in a fantastic personal negotiation with the Lebanese, with Nasser, with the Syrians, the Americans, the British, everybody. That was high-level personal diplomacy, and he could do that. But, of course, when he got into the Congo—where nobody was playing by the Queensberry or any other rules, and indeed had never heard of them,…he got into a mess—so did we all—because he was in an area where there just weren’t any rules—and people were scared, which also made it worse….
(Urquhart, oral history project 1984, 28)

Hammarskjöld excelled at face-to-face encounters. He had a knack of inspiring confidence and of piercing through another’s reserve. He could be disarmingly direct, but also, as need arose, involved and subtle, sometimes to the point of obscurity. His transparent sincerity and sense of dedication inspired a remarkable degree of confidence. His style of speech was highly personal and expressive, and when excited by a thought, as tightly packed as shorthand. It frequently required intellectual athletics to keep pace with his rapid flow of ideas. He carried an air of total attention, alert to the slightest nuance of word or gesture. He seemed able to sense what was in one’s mind and to provide the answer even before a thought was fully formulated.
(Dayal (1), 302-03)

◊ ◊ ◊